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Abstract: In construction projects, some contractors will take default actions against the contracts to
obtain maximum profits and damage the owners’ benefits as a result. In the construction markets
where effective supervision is not performed well, contractors have more opportunities to default.
Surety bonds were designed to solve the default problems and promote the sustainable development
of the construction markets. This paper was proposed to explore the interactions between owners
and contractors and investigate the influence of surety bonds (high penalty and low penalty) on the
default behavior of contractors based on a static and dynamic evolutionary game analysis model.
The results showed that applying the surety bond strategy is effective at decreasing the probability
of the contractors’ default behavior when the credit system based on a surety bond system is well
developed in the construction industry and the cost of the surety bond is low enough. Therefore,
government strategies such as a better development of the credit system driven by surety bonds and
the subsidies on surety bonds to reduce the cost can mitigate the contractors’ default behavior and
keep the sustainability of the construction markets.
Keywords: contractors; default; surety bond; evolutionary game; construction market
1. Introduction
Construction projects generally involve a large upfront investment, long-term implementation
and many stakeholders [1–5]. Potential risks of these types of projects present themselves in every
stage—from planning, design, and construction through to completion. As a result, contracts are
well designed to guarantee the interests of each stakeholder. However, the contracts cannot always
regulate all the parties, especially the contractors. As a result, the contractors tend to maximize
their profits through default behavior in the construction projects. This leads to the distortion of
credit in the construction industry and default risk. The default of the contractor harms the project
owners, investors, banks and many other stakeholders [6]. Even though the owners and other
stakeholders can claim compensation, the process of litigation is still exhausting and expensive, and
thus damages the sustainable development of the construction markets. In recent years, surety bonds
have been introduced as a risk transfer instrument to protect the owners from the default risk of the
contractors and keep the sustainability of the construction markets, especially for the markets without
effective supervision.
Despite the agreement on the importance of surety bonds to the contractors’ behavior, very few
researchers have studied how the owners use surety bonds to mitigate the default behavior of the
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contractors. This paper is thus aimed at analyzing the behaviors and interactions between owners and
contractors under surety bond from the perspective of Evolutionary Game (EG). Then, we will further
investigate the factors related to surety bonds that influence the evolutionary strategies of owners and
contractors, especially the default strategies of contractors. The research can illuminate new ideas for
improving the sustainability of the construction industry.
The remaining of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the prior research on default risk, surety
bond and EG theory applications in the construction industry. Section 3 describes the research problem
and related assumptions. Section 4 introduces the static EG model and analysis. Section 5 constructs a
dynamic EG model. Section 6 simulates the dynamic EG model and analyzes the simulation results.
Section 7 concludes with the findings of this paper and discusses the research that led to such findings.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Default Risk in Construction Industry
Default risk is a widely concerned problem for the government, owners, banks, insurance
companies and other stakeholders in the construction industry. Most of the previous research with
regard to this issue mainly focuses on the default risk prediction. The models to predict the default
risk of the contractors mainly include the linear models built in the early stage of the industry and
more recently developed artificial intelligence models based on data mining methods. Kangari et al. [7]
proposed a multiple regression model of six variables to analyze the performance of construction
companies and make predictions. Russell and Zhai [8] developed a contractor default forecast model
based on the stochastic dynamics of economic and financial variables. The error rate for distinguishing
between default companies and non-default ones is only 22%. Further improved models have been
proposed based in this research, including the Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (MDA) model [9]
and Logistic Regression (LR) model [10], with better prediction results. Horta and Camanho [4]
have studied contractors in Portugal and proposed a prediction model based on the Supported
Vector Machine (SVM) method, which outperformed the LR model in terms of prediction accuracy.
Cheng et al. [11] improved the SVM model by combining Enforced Support Vector Machine (ESVM)
and grey system theory, which can precisely predict the results based on scarce and incomplete data.
Choi et al. [12] have introduced an improved prediction model to predict default risk for two or three
years by implementing an ensemble classifier. The model has overcome the shortcomings of short-term
forecasts in previous models.
Some other researchers focus on the factors causing the default behavior of contractors.
You et al. [13] pointed out the positive effect of uncertainty on contractors’ opportunistic default
behavior, but a good control of contracts is helpful to mitigate the environmental uncertainty-induced
opportunistic behavior. Nasir and Hadikusumo [14] conducted research on the key factors influencing
contractors’ opportunistic default behavior at the preconstruction and construction stage. Zhang and
Qian [15] explored the mechanism of the opportunistic default behavior of contractors by considering
the role of risk perceptions. Liu et al. [16] identified five groups of inducers influencing contractors’
opportunistic default behavior: culture-related inducers, policy environment, project pressures,
individual traits and organizational climate, and used these factors to study the formation mechanism
of opportunistic default behavior. Lu et al. [17] used questionnaire-based data to investigate the effect
of contract completeness on contractors’ opportunistic default behavior. Zhang et al. [18] constructed
a theoretical linkage model to prove that inappropriate risk allocation in contracts will negatively
influence the contractor’s cooperative behavior.
2.2. Surety Bond in Construction Industry
A surety bond is introduced as a risk transfer instrument to protect the owners from the unexpected
default behavior of contractors [19,20] and promotes the sustainability of construction markets. There
are mainly two kinds of surety bond, the low-penalty unconditional bond (on-demand bond) and
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high-penalty conditional bond (on-default bond), which are popular in the United States and the
international markets, respectively [21]. The difference between a conditional bond and unconditional
bond is based on whether any preconditions must be met before the claim of the bond. So if the
contractors submit an unconditional bond, they are exposed to the risk that default will be claimed
even though there is no proof [22,23]. The penalty is the amount one could claim on the bond.
The highest penalty is 100% of the project value in the United States, while the proportion lowers
itself to about 10% in the international markets [24]. The conditional bond is feasible only with the
high-penalty requirement [21] and it will better protect the owners from the default of the contractors.
Furthermore, as surety bond institutions are tied to the contractors, they have an incentive to keep
the contractors from defaulting through a complicated process of surety underwriting—that is, the
contractor prequalification. A great effort has been made to formulate efficient surety underwriting
models, including a scoring-based approach [25], fuzzy expert system [26,27], data envelopment
analysis [28], artificial intelligence model [29] and so on, which all require detailed information collection
and investigation. If the information of contractors from surety institutions can be exchanged through
a specific platform, the construction market credit system (CMCS) can be then established to better
restrict the default behavior and support the sustainable development of the construction industry.
2.3. Evolutionary Game Analysis in Construction Industry
Evolutionary game (EG) theory is a branch of game theory, which was first proposed by Nash [30].
The basic idea of EG theory is that the game players perform repeated games in a group of a certain
size. However, EG theory differs from game theory in that it replaces the assumption of completely
rational players with the assumption of bounded rational players [31,32] and replicator dynamics [33].
The assumption of bounded rational individuals indicates that both players cannot reach the optimal
equilibrium points in each game and the probabilities of each strategy will change dynamically. We
can use Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) to describe the evolution and analyze the equilibrium based
on replicator dynamics [31,32]. The replication dynamics describe the frequency of a strategy used in a
population in the form of dynamic differential equation. If the growth rate of the replication dynamics
is zero, equilibrium is reached. ESS is a special kind of equilibrium which describes a stable state.
The EG model was widely used in different fields. For example, Bester and Guth [34] used
evolutionary game theory to explain the altruistic preferences of human beings in natural or cultural
choices, which depends on the type of strategic interaction. Dufwenberg and Güth [35] investigated the
strategy results of sellers under a duopoly competition market based on evolutionary game analysis.
Naini et al. [36] studied the environmental supply chain management based on evolutionary game
theory and found the influence of public pressure on environmental supply chain management.
In the construction industry, the EG model has also been applied to analyze the complex behavior
strategies evolution. Wang et al. [37] built an EG model to find the behavioral evolution between
governments and private investors in Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects considering the
information of new media. Li et al. [38] investigated a cooperation mechanism among stakeholders of
PPP mega-infrastructure projects by using the EG model. Zhu et al. [39] used EG theory to analyze
the cooperation relationship of main contractors and subcontractors in mega-projects. Hao et al. [40]
explored the knowledge-sharing behavior evolution of the enterprises in the construction supply chain.
Yang et al. [41] constructed a conceptual framework for enhancing risk management in Engineering
Procurement Construction (EPC) projects using EG theory. Zheng et al. [42] and Du et al. [43]
conducted research on the moral hazard behavior mechanism of Building Information Modeling (BIM)
implementations based on the EG model. Sun et al. [44] studied the job mobility of workers by using an
EG approach to analyze the dynamic relationship between workers and their employers. Pi et al. [45]
analyzed how to improve the construction safety supervision from the perspective of EG theory.
Chen et al. [46] used the EG model to investigate the behavior evolution of sponge city developers
under the supervision of the government and revealed the effect of key factors on the sponge city
construction promotion. Chen et al. [47] explored the behavior mechanism of contractors and the
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government in construction and demolition waste management through EG analysis. Sun et al. [48]
developed an EG model to study the dynamic relationship between construction workers and their
employers about vocational skills training. Shi et al. [49] studied the cooperation between suppliers in
the supply chain of the construction industry based on EG analysis and identified the critical influential
factors. Xu et al. [50] identified the driving factors to enhance the collaboration between designers
and contractors for building energy performance by using the EG model. Pan et al. [51] studied
the evolutionary behaviors of related stakeholders in the professional liability insurance market of
construction industry based on EG analysis.
2.4. Summary of the Literature Review
Previous studies have focused on the topic of default risk, surety bond and evolutionary game
applications in construction industry. However, there are still some research gaps. First, the issue
regarding how surety bonds influence the default behavior evolution of contractors is still underexplored.
Second, few studies have been conducted using an of analysis contractors’ default behavior from the
perspective of EG theory. As EG theory can be used to analyze the mechanism of complex behavior
strategies’ evolution from a long-term microperspective and identify the effects of influential factors on
the equilibrium of strategies, it is appropriate for default behavior research to be carried out in the
construction industry. Third, most previous studies on the application of EG theory in the construction
industry just use static factors. However, dynamic factors are more common in the construction
industry and thus the EG model with dynamic factors is more suitable for the contractors’ default
behavior analysis. This paper is aimed to fill the research gaps by proposing a dynamic EG model to
investigate the effects of surety bonds on the default behavior evolution of contractors and how to
change the factors related to surety bonds to mitigate the default behavior. The results of the paper can
provide effective strategies to regulate the contractors’ default behavior and serve as a foundation for
risk management in the construction industry so as to promote the sustainability of the industry.
3. Problem Description and Assumptions
3.1. Problem Description
In the construction industry, the most important and complex relationship is between the owners
and the contractors. Generally, the contractors will seek to maximize their own benefits at the expense
of the owners—that is, the default in construction markets. The typical default behavior of contractors
is conducting unsatisfactory work or using inferior materials to increase profits, which results in
poor-quality buildings. For a construction market without effective supervision, such as China’s
market, thousands of accidents occur due to the default behavior of the contractors. For the owners,
they might adopt a surety bond strategy, as mentioned in Section 2.2, to reduce the default risk of
contractors but face an increase in cost. It is a game problem related to owners and contractors which
strategy to adopt.
In this game problem, both players, contractors and owners, can be treated as bounded rational
individuals, as they generally make their own decisions with incomplete information in construction
projects. Both players’ initial strategies are not optimal. However, both contractors and owners can
adjust their strategies to maximize their benefits after they obtain more information of construction
projects. Through a repeated process of strategy adjustment, both contractors and owners gradually
reach their optimal strategies. As the game between contractors and owners is in line with EG theory,
the behavior evolution between contractors and owners can be analyzed in the EG model.
3.2. Model Assumptions
In this research, we will analyze the behaviors between the owners and the contractors under
a low-penalty unconditional bond and high-penalty conditional bond conditions. Here we propose
six assumptions: (1) the financial and operational capacity of contractors is good enough, so the
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default behavior of contractors is subjective; (2) the owners will not default, as regulations such as the
contractors’ priority of compensation will ensure that the owners pay the cost of contractors; (3) surety
bond institutions obey all the regulations; (4) the contractors’ profits under the “default” strategy are
higher than the profits under the “not default” strategy, which is the incentive for the contractors to
choose the “default” strategy; (5) generally, the contractors’ claim on additional cost caused by the
owners will be included in the revenues of the contractors. However, here we exclude this part, as the
contractors’ revenue from claim equals the actual cost caused by the owners, but the additional cost
caused by the contractors themselves will not be excluded; (6) the cost of the surety bond is generally
paid by the contractors, but here we assume that the cost is transferred to the owners, as the owners
will cover all the costs of the contractors.
The two strategies for owners are surety bond and “not surety bond”, while the strategies for
contractors are “not default” and “default”. The ideal strategy equilibrium is (not default, not surety
bond), which is the goal for the construction markets. In addition, the strategy (not default, not surety
bond) is also a good strategy’s equilibrium. Here, we set the proportion of contractors implementing
the “not default” strategy as x (x ∈ [0, 1]), while the proportion of contractors implementing the
“default” strategy is 1 − x. For owners, the proportion of owners adopting the surety bond strategy is y
(y ∈ [0, 1]), while the proportion of owners adopting the “not surety bond” strategy is 1 − y. So, the
ideal strategy equilibrium can also be written as (1, 0), and the less perfect one is (1, 1). The following
is the meaning of related parameters, which is also shown in Table 1.
For the owners, suppose the revenue from the construction projects is Rof if the contractors adopt
the “not default” strategy, while the revenue is Rou (Rou << Rof) if the contractors default. When the
contractors adopt the “default” strategy, the quality of the projects will be reduced and the value of the
projects will be much less. So, we can assume Rou << Rof. We also suppose the owners’ costs of the
construction projects are Cof and Cou (Cou < Cof) if the contractors implement the “not default” strategy
and “default” strategy, respectively. Here the costs of surety bonds are excluded from Cof and Cou, and
are assumed to be Cs1 and Cs2 under the high-penalty conditional bond and low-penalty unconditional
bond. When the contractors implement the “default” strategy, they often reduce their bid price by
carrying out unsatisfactory work or using inferior materials to win the bid. So, we can assume that
the owners’ costs of construction projects are lower when the contractors implement the “default”
strategy—that is, Cou < Cof. The value Lou is the owners’ loss resulting from the default of contractors.
For the contractors, suppose the revenue from the construction projects is Rcf if they adopt the “not
default” strategy and the revenue is Rcu if they adopt the “default” strategy. We further suppose the
contractors’ costs of the construction projects are Ccf and Ccu under the “not default” strategy and
“default” strategy, respectively. Here, according to Assumption 4 above, we can infer that Rcf − Ccf <
Rcu − Ccu. If the contractors adopt a “default” strategy, they will be punished P2 under a low-penalty
unconditional bond, while they will not only be punished P1 but also be pursued P3 reimbursement
under the high-penalty conditional bond, according to the punishment agreement in the construction
contracts. Furthermore, the long-term revenue from the good reputation of surety bond institutions is
Rcl and the long-term loss from the poor reputation in surety bond institutions is Lcl. Here, we assume
that the non-default behavior will improve the reputation while the default behavior will damage
the reputation compared to the situation that they do not conduct the construction projects, and the
values of Rcl and Lcl are related to the CMCS promoted by the surety bond system. For both players,
∆P4 is the bid price reduction because of the high-penalty conditional bond. Generally, a composite
bid evaluation is implemented to select the contractors under a low-penalty unconditional bond or
without a surety bond. However, under a high-penalty conditional bond, the lowest bid price can be
selected. Subsequently the bid price will be reduced compared to the composite bid price.
Sustainability 2020, 12, 9162 6 of 28
Table 1. Descriptions of related parameters and variables.
Variables Descriptions Variables Descriptions
x The proportion of contractorsadopting “not default” strategy y
The proportion of owners
adopting “surety bond” strategy
Parameters Descriptions Parameters Descriptions
Rof
The owners’ revenue from the
construction projects if the
contractors adopt “not default”
strategy
Cof
The owners’ cost on the
construction projects if the
contractors adopt “not default”
strategy
Rou
The owners’ revenue from the




The owners’ cost on the




The contractors’ revenue from the
construction projects if they adopt
“not default” strategy
Ccf
The contractors’ cost on the
construction projects if they adopt
“not default” strategy
Rcu
The contractors’ revenue from the
construction projects if they adopt
“default” strategy
Ccu
The contractors’ cost on the




revenue from the good reputation
in surety bond institutions
Lcl
The contractors’ long-term loss
from the poor reputation in surety
bond institutions
P1




The owners’ loss resulting from
the default of the contractors
P2








due to default under high-penalty
conditional bond
Cs2
The owners’ cost on the
low-penalty unconditional bond
∆P4
The bid price reduction under
high-penalty conditional bond
4. Static Model
4.1. Static Model Description
We can create the payoff matrix according to the description in Section 3, as shown in Table 2.
The calculations of utility under the low-penalty unconditional bond and high-penalty conditional
bond [21] are shown in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Then, we further calculated related equations to
establish the static EG model.
Table 2. Payoff matrix.
Contractors
Owners
Surety Bond (y) Not Surety Bond (1 − y)
not default (x) C11, O11 C12, O12
default (1 − x) C21, O21 C22, O22
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Table 3. Calculation of the utility under low-penalty unconditional bond in payoff matrix in static model.
Utility Calculation Utility Calculation
C11 Rcf + Rcl − Ccf O11 Rof − Cof − Cs2
C12 Rcf − Ccf O12 Rof − Cof
C21 Rcu − Ccu − P2− Lcl O21 Rou + P2 − Cou − Cs2 − Lou
C22 Rcu − Ccu O22 Rou − Cou − Lou
Table 4. Calculation of the utility under a high-penalty conditional bond in payoff matrix in static model.
Variables Descriptions Variables Descriptions
C11 Rcf + Rcl − Ccf − ∆P4 O11 Rof − Cof − Cs1+ ∆P4
C12 Rcf − Ccf O12 Rof − Cof
C21 Rcu − Ccu − P3− P1− Lcl − ∆P4 O21 Rof + P1− Cou − Cs1+ ∆P4
C22 Rcu − Ccu O22 Rou − Cou − Lou
Equations (1) and (2) show the expected utility of contractors with the “not default” strategy and
“default” strategy. Then, we calculated the average utility of contractors, as Equation (3) shows.
E1x = y ∗C11 + (1− y) ∗C12, (1)
E11−x = y ∗C21 + (1− y) ∗C22, (2)
E1 = x ∗ E1x + (1− x) ∗ E11−x, (3)
Equations (4) and (5) show the expected utility of owners with the “surety bond” strategy and
“not surety bond” strategy. Then, we calculated the average utility of owners, as Equation (6) shows.
E2y = x ∗O11 + (1− x) ∗O21, (4)
E21−y = x ∗O12 + (1− x) ∗O22, (5)
E2 = y ∗ E2y + (1− y) ∗ E21−y, (6)
Resembling the description in the study of Friedman [52], dynamic differential equations are used
as the replicator dynamic system to describe the frequency of an especial strategy used in a population.
So, the replicator dynamic equations of Contractors, F(x), and Owners, F(y), are calculated as Equations
















= y(1− y)[(O11 + O22 −O12 −O21)x + O21 −O22], (8)
4.2. Static Model Analysis
4.2.1. Static Model under Low-Penalty Unconditional Bond
We used the parameters in Table 3 to calculate Equations (7) and (8), and obtain the new equations,
Equations (9) and (10). The two equations are the replicator dynamic system (I).
F(x) = x(1− x)
[
(Rcl + Lcl + P2)y + Rc f −Rcu + Ccu −Cc f
]
, (9)
F(y) = y(1− y)[−P2x + P2 −Cs2], (10)
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Proposition 1. The equilibrium points of the replicator dynamic system (I) are (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) and






Rcu −Rc f + Cc f −Ccu
Rcl + Lcl + P2
, (12)
Proof 1. Let Equation (9) = 0 and Equation (10) = 0, we can acquire the equilibrium points of the
replicator dynamic system (I), (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) and (x1, y1), when x1, y1 ∈ [0, 1]. 
Not all of the equilibrium points are ESS [52], so the Jacobian matrix is used here to analyze the











 = (1− 2x)[(Rcl + Lcl + P2)y + Rc f −Rcu + Ccu −Cc f ] x(1− x)(Rcl + Lcl + P2)
−y(1− y)P2 (1− 2y)(−P2x + P2 −Cs2)
,
(13)
Then we calculated the detJ and trJ to analyze the stability of the equilibrium points. If detJ > 0, trJ
< 0, the equilibrium points are ESS: if detJ > 0, trJ > 0, the equilibrium points are instability points; if
detJ < 0, the equilibrium points are saddle points; if detJ > 0, trJ = 0, the equilibrium points are central
points. The calculation of detJ and trJ is shown in Equations (14) and (15):
detJ1 = (1− 2x)(1− 2y)
[
(Rcl + Lcl + P2)y + Rc f −Rcu + Ccu −Cc f
]
(−P2x + P2 −Cs2)+
x(1− x)(Rcl + Lcl + P2)y(1− y)P2,
(14)
trJ1 = (1− 2x)
[
(Rcl + Lcl + P2)y + Rc f −Rcu + Ccu −Cc f
]
+ (1− 2y)(−P2x + P2 −Cs2), (15)
Proposition 2. (1) When Rcl + P2 + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, (0, 1) is the ESS of the replicator dynamic
system (I) and the strategy is (default, surety bond).
(2) When Rcl + P2 + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, there is no ESS of the replicator dynamic system (I) and there
is only a central point (x1, y1).
Proof 2. Based on the principles to judge the stability of the abovementioned equilibrium points, we
can obtain the results in Table 5. 
Table 5. Stability of the equilibrium points in static model under low-penalty unconditional bond.
Equilibrium Points Rcl + P2+ Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu Rcl + P2+ Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu
detJ1 trJ1 State detJ1 trJ1 State
(0, 0) − ± Saddle point − ± Saddle point
(0, 1) + − ESS − ± Saddle point
(1, 0) − ± Saddle point − ± Saddle point
(1, 1) + + Instability point − ± Saddle point
(x1, y1) / / / + 0 Central point
From the results in Table 5, we can see whether Rcl + P2 + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu or Rcl + P2 +
Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, the ideal strategies cannot be reached under a low-penalty unconditional
bond. Here Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu can be treated as the opportunistic profits of contractors. We assumed
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that the value of Rcl and Lcl are related to the CMCS promoted by the surety bond system—that is, the
value of Rcl and Lcl will be larger if CMCS is better developed. As the value of P2 is relatively smaller
than Rcl and Lcl, the relation between Rcl + P2 + Lcl and Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu is mainly determined by
the value of Rcl and Lcl. Under the low-penalty unconditional bond, if the CMCS is not well-developed
(Rcl + P2 + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu), the ESS is (default, surety bond), which is absolutely not a good
state. However, CMCS can be developed (Rcl + P2 + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu) to reach a better but
not ideal state. However, there is not an ESS in the latter case. So, we will introduce dynamic model
analysis in Section 5 to further analyze the situation.
4.2.2. Static Model under High-Penalty Conditional Bond
We used the parameters in Table 4 to calculate Equations (7) and (8), and obtain the new equations,
Equations (16) and (17). The two equations are the replicator dynamic systems (II).
F(x) = x(1− x)
[
(Rcl + Lcl + P1 + P3)y + Rc f −Rcu + Ccu −Cc f
]
, (16)
F(y) = y(1− y)
[(
Rou − Lou −Ro f − P1
)
x + Ro f + P1 −Cs1 + ∆P4 −Rou + Lou
]
, (17)
Proposition 3. The equilibrium points of the replicator dynamic system (II) are (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) and
(x2, y2), x2, y2 ∈ [0, 1]. The calculation of x2 and y2 is shown in Equations (18) and (19).
x2 =
Ro f + P1 −Cs1 + ∆P4 −Rou + Lou
Lou + Ro f + P1 −Rou
, (18)
y2 =
Rcu −Rc f + Cc f −Ccu
Rcl + Lcl + P1 + P3
, (19)
Proof 3. Let Equation (18) = 0 and Equation (19) = 0, we can obtain the equilibrium points of the
replicator dynamic system (II), (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) and (x2, y2), when x2, y2 ∈ [0, 1]. 
Then we calculated the Jacobian matrix, detJ and trJ to analyze the stability of the equilibrium
points. (The expression of the Jacobian matrix, detJ and trJ is provided in Appendix A as Equations
(A1)–(A3)).
Proposition 4. (1) When Rcl + P3 + P1 + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and Cs1 < ∆P4, (0, 1) is the ESS of the
replicator dynamic system (II) and the strategy is (default, surety bond).
(2) When Rcl + P3 + P1 + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and Cs1 > ∆P4, (0, 1) is the ESS of the replicator dynamic
system (II) and the strategy is (default, surety bond).
(3) When Rcl + P3 + P1 + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and Cs1 < ∆P4, (1, 1) is the ESS of the replicator dynamic
system (II) and the strategy is (not default, surety bond).
(4) When Rcl + P3 + P1 + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and Cs1 > ∆P4, there is no ESS of the replicator dynamic
system (II) and there is only a central point (x2, y2).
Proof 4. Based on the principles to judge the stability of the abovementioned equilibrium points, we
can obtain the results in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Stability of the equilibrium points in static model under high-penalty conditional bond.
Equilibrium Points
Rcl + P3+ P1+ Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu
Cs1< ∆P4 Cs1> ∆P4
detJ2 trJ2 State detJ2 trJ2 State
(0, 0) − ± Saddle point − ± Saddle point
(0, 1) + − ESS + − ESS
(1, 0) + + Instability point − ± Saddle point
(1, 1) − ± Saddle point + + Instability point
Equilibrium Points
Rcl + P3+ P1+ Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu
Cs1< ∆P4 Cs1> ∆P4
detJ2 trJ2 State detJ2 trJ2 State
(0, 0) − ± Saddle point − ± Saddle point
(0, 1) − ± Saddle point − ± Saddle point
(1, 0) + + Instability point − ± Saddle point
(1, 1) + − ESS − ± Saddle point
(x2, y2) / / / + 0 Central point
From the results in Table 6, we can see that if Rcl + P3 + P1 + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, the strategy
(default, surety bond) will be reached (no matter Cs1 < ∆P4 or Cs1 > ∆P4), which is not our aim. We
can improve the state through a better developed CMCS (Rcl + P3 + P1 + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu)
promoted by the surety bond system and a reduced cost of high-penalty conditional bond (Cs1 < ∆P4),
and finally the ideal strategy (not default, surety bond) will thus be reached. However, if the cost of
high-penalty conditional bonds cannot be reduced enough (Cs1 > ∆P4), there is not an ESS point. Thus,
we need to further study the situation through dynamic model analysis in the following section.
5. Dynamic Model
5.1. Dynamic Model Description
In the construction industry, dynamic factors such as dynamic cost of surety bonds, dynamic
punishment and so on are more realistic and desirable. In this section, we introduce dynamic factors to
the EG model, and then propose a dynamic EG model to further analyze the behaviors between owners
and contractors under both low-penalty unconditional bonds and high-penalty conditional bonds. In
this paper, the dynamic EG model indicates the EG model with dynamic factors, while the static EG
model indicates the EG model with static factors. The analysis follows the dynamic evolutionary game
framework of [53,54]. Rcl, the contractors’ long-term potential revenue from the good reputation of
surety bond institutions, is supposed to decrease if more contractors choose the “not default” strategy,
while Lcl, the contractors’ long-term potential loss from the poor reputation of surety bond institutions,
is supposed to decrease with the growing ratio of contractors implementing the “default” strategy. So,
the parameters, Rcl and Lcl, are replaced by dynamic factors Rcl(1 − x) and Lcl ∗ x, respectively, where
Rcl indicates the upper bound value of contractors’ long-term revenue from the good reputation of
surety bond institutions, Lcl indicates the upper bound value of contractors’ long-term loss from the
poor reputation of surety bond institutions. We further assume that the cost of surety bonds (Cs1, Cs2)
and the contractors’ contract penalty for defaults (P1, P2) will increase if the proportion of contractors
adopting the “not default” strategy decreases, because contractors’ default behavior causes a high risk,
which produces the risk premium. So, the parameters, Cs1 (or Cs2) and P1 (or P2), are replaced by
Cs1(1 − px) (or Cs2(1 − qx)) and P1(1 − mx) (or P2(1 − nx)), respectively. In detail, p and q describe the
influence of contractors’ “not default” strategy on the change of the cost of surety bonds, while m and
n describe the influence of contractors’ “not default” strategy on the change of the contract penalty
for default. Now Cs1 (or Cs2) and P1 (or P2) indicate the upper bound values of surety bond cost and
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contract penalty for default, respectively. The new calculations of utility and related parameters that
we have adjusted are shown in Tables 7–9.
Table 7. Calculation of the utility under low-penalty unconditional bond in payoff matrix in
dynamic model.
Utility Calculation Utility Calculation
C11 Rcf + Rcl(1 − x) − Ccf O11 Rof − Cof − Cs2(1 − qx)
C12 Rcf − Ccf O12 Rof − Cof
C21 Rcu − Ccu − P2(1 − nx) − Lcl ∗ x O21 Rou + P2(1 − nx) − Cou − Cs2(1 − qx) − Lou
C22 Rcu − Ccu O22 Rou − Cou − Lou
Table 8. Calculation of the utility under high-penalty conditional bond in payoff matrix in
dynamic model.
Variables Descriptions Variables Descriptions
C11 Rcf + Rcl(1 − x) − Ccf − ∆P4 O11 Rof −Cof −Cs1(1 − px) + ∆P4
C12 Rcf −Ccf O12 Rof −Cof
C21 Rcu −Ccu −P3−P1(1 − mx) − Lcl*x − ∆P4 O21 Rof + P1(1 − mx) − Cou − Cs1(1 − px) + ∆P4
C22 Rcu −Ccu O22 Rou −Cou −Lou
Table 9. Descriptions of related parameters and variables in dynamic model.
Variables Descriptions Variables Descriptions
x The proportion of contractorsadopting “not default” strategy y
The proportion of owners adopting
“surety bond” strategy
Parameters Descriptions Parameters Descriptions
Rof
The owners’ revenue from the
construction projects if the
contractors adopt “not default”
strategy
Cof
The owners’ cost on the construction
projects if the contractors adopt “not
default” strategy
Rou
The owners’ revenue from the
construction projects if the
contractors adopt “default” strategy
Cou
The owners’ cost on the
construction projects if the
contractors adopt “default” strategy
Rcf
The contractors’ revenue from the
construction projects if they adopt
“not default” strategy
Ccf
The contractors’ cost on the
construction projects if they adopt
“not default” strategy
Rcu
The contractors’ revenue from the
construction projects if they adopt
“default” strategy
Ccu
The contractors’ cost on the
construction projects if they adopt
“default” strategy
Rcl(1 − x)
The contractors’ dynamic long-term
revenue from the good reputation in
surety bond institutions
Lcl ∗ x
The contractors’ dynamic long-term
loss from the poor reputation in
surety bond institutions
P1(1 − mx),
m ∈ [0, 1]
The contractors’ dynamic
punishment for default under
high-penalty conditional bond
Lou
The owners’ loss resulting from the
default of the contractors
P2(1 − nx),
n ∈ [0, 1]
The contractors’ dynamic
punishment for default under
low-penalty unconditional bond
Cs1(1 − px),
p ∈ [0, 1]
The owners’ dynamic cost on the
high-penalty conditional bond
P3
The contractors’ reimbursement due
to default under high-penalty
conditional bond
Cs2(1 − qx),
q ∈ [0, 1]
The owners’ dynamic cost on the
low-penalty unconditional bond
∆P4
The bid price reduction under
high-penalty conditional bond
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5.2. Dynamic Model Analysis
5.2.1. Dynamic Model under Low-penalty Unconditional Bond
We used these new parameters to calculate Equations (7) and (8), and obtain the new equations,
Equations (20) and (21). The two equations are the replicator dynamic system (III).
F(x) = x(1− x)
[
(Lcl −Rcl − P2n)xy + (Rcl + P2)y + Rc f −Rcu + Ccu −Cc f
]
, (20)
F(y) = y(1− y)
[
P2nx2 + (Cs2q− P2 − P2n)x + P2 −Cs2
]
, (21)
Proposition 5. The equilibrium points of the replicator dynamic system (III) are (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1), (x3,










Rcu −Rc f + Cc f −Ccu
(Lcl −Rcl − P2n)x3 + Rcl + P2
, (23)
x4 =
Rcu −Rc f + Cc f −Ccu −Rcl − P2
Lcl −Rcl − P2n
, (24)
Proof 5. If Equation (20) = 0 and Equation (21) = 0, we can obtain the equilibrium points of the
replicator dynamic system (III), (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1), (x3, y3) and (x4, 1), when x3, y3, x4 ∈ [0, 1]. 
Then we can calculate the Jacobian matrix, detJ and trJ to analyze the stability of the equilibrium
points. (The expression of the Jacobian matrix, detJ and trJ are provided in Appendix A as Equations
(A4)–(A6)).
Proposition 6. (1) When P2 + Rcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and P2(1 − n) + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, (0, 1)
is the ESS of the replicator dynamic system (III) and the strategy is (default, surety bond).
(2) When P2 + Rcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and P2(1 − n) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, (0, 1) is the ESS of the
replicator dynamic system (III) and the strategy is (default, surety bond). If x4 ∈ [0, 1], y3 ∈ [0, 1], (x3, y3) is the
central point.
(3) When P2 + Rcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and P2(1 − n) + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, (x4, 1) is the ESS of
the replicator dynamic system (III) if x4 ∈ [0, 1], y3 < [0, 1] and there is also an asymptotic stable point (x3, y3) if
x4 ∈ [0, 1], y3 ∈ [0, 1] and Lcl − Rcl − P2n < 0.
(4) When P2 + Rcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and P2(1 − n) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, there is no ESS of the
replicator dynamic system (III). However, there is an asymptotic stable point (x3, y3) if x4 ∈ [0, 1], y3 ∈ [0, 1]
and Lcl − Rcl − P2n < 0.
Proof 6. Based on the principles to judge the stability of the abovementioned equilibrium points, we
can obtain the result in Table 10. 
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Table 10. Stability of the equilibrium points in dynamic model under low-penalty unconditional bond.
Equilibrium Points
P2+ Rcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu
P2(1 − n) + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf −
Ccu
P2(1 − n) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu −
Rcf − Ccu
detJ3 trJ3 State detJ3 trJ3 State SpecialCondition
(0, 0) − ± Saddle point − ± Saddle point /
(0, 1) + − ESS + − ESS /
(1, 0) − ± Saddle point − ± Saddle point /
(1, 1) + + Instability point − ± Saddle point /
(x3, y3) / / / + + Central point
x4 ∈ [0, 1]
y3 ∈ [0, 1]
(x4, 1) / / / − ± Saddle point
x4 ∈ [0, 1]
y3 ∈ [0, 1]
(x4, 1) / / / + + Instability point
x4 ∈ [0, 1]
y3 < [0, 1]
Equilibrium Points
P2+ Rcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu
P2(1 − n) + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf −
Ccu
P2(1 − n) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu −
Rcf − Ccu
detJ3 trJ3 State detJ3 trJ3 State SpecialCondition
(0, 0) − ± Saddle point − ± Saddle point /
(0, 1) − ± Saddle point − ± Saddle point /
(1, 0) − ± Saddle point − ± Saddle point /
(1, 1) + + Instability point − ± Saddle point /





x4 ∈ [0, 1]
y3 ∈ [0, 1]
Lcl − Rcl2 −
Pn < 0
(x3, y3) / / / + + Central point
x4 ∈ [0, 1]
y3 ∈ [0, 1]
Lcl − Rcl 2
− Pn > 0
(x4, 1) − ± Saddle point / / /
x4 ∈ [0, 1]
y3 ∈ [0, 1]
(x4, 1) + − ESS / / /
x4 ∈ [0, 1]
y3 < [0, 1]
From the results in Table 10, we can see once the value of Rcl, the contractors’ long-term revenue
from the good reputation in surety bond institutions, is not large enough (P2 + Rcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf
− Ccu), the strategy (default, surety bond) will be reached as ESS under a low-penalty unconditional
bond (no matter P2 (1 − n) + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu or P2(1 − n) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu), which
is not our goal. So, we need to increase Rcl (P2 + Rcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu) to reach a better state—that
is, to increase the non-default contractors’ opportunity of getting the bid on construction projects in the
future. If P2(1 − n) + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, a good ESS strategy (x4, 1) and an asymptotic stable
point (x3, y3) will be reached. Then we decrease the default contractors’ opportunity of getting the bid
on construction projects in the future to increase the value of Lcl (P2(1 − n) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu).
However, this scenario has no ESS and still has the asymptotic stable point (x3, y3) when x4 ∈ [0, 1],
y3 ∈ [0, 1] and Lcl − Rcl − P2n < 0. The numerical analysis on the dynamic EG model will be further
discussed in Section 6.
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5.2.2. Dynamic Model under High-Penalty Conditional Bond
We used these new parameters to calculate Equations (7) and (8), and obtain the new equations,
Equations (25) and (26). The two equations are the replicator dynamic system (IV).
F(x) = x(1− x)
[
(Lcl −Rcl − P1m)xy + (Rcl + P1 + P3)y + Rc f −Rcu + Ccu −Cc f
]
, (25)
F(y) = y(1− y)
 P1mx2 +
(
Rou − Lou −Ro f − P1 − P1m + Cs1p
)
x
+Ro f + P1 −Cs1 + ∆P4 −Rou + Lou
, (26)
Proposition 7. The equilibrium points of the replicator dynamic system (IV) are (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1), (x5,
y5) and (x6, 1), x5, y5, x6 ∈ [0, 1]. The calculation of x5, y5 and x6 is shown in Equations (27)–(29).
x5 =
Lou + Ro f + P1 + P1m−Cs1p−Rou −
√√ (









Rcu −Rc f + Cc f −Ccu
(Lcl −Rcl − P1m)x4 + Rcl + P1 + P3
, (28)
x6 =
Rcu −Rc f + Cc f −Ccu −Rcl − P1 − P3
Lcl −Rcl − P1m
, (29)
Proof 7. Let Equation (25) = 0 and Equation (26) = 0, we can obtain the equilibrium points of the
replicator dynamic system (IV), (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (x5, y5) and (x6, 1), when x5, y5, x6 ∈ [0, 1]. 
Then, we calculated the Jacobian matrix, detJ and trJ to analyze the stability of the equilibrium
points. (The expression of Jacobian matrix, detJ and trJ are provided in Appendix A as Equations
(A7)–(A9)).
Proposition 8. (1) When P3 + P1 + Rcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, P3 + P1(1 − m) + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf −
Ccu and Cs1(1 − p) < ∆P4, (0, 1) is the ESS of the replicator dynamic system (IV) and the strategy is (default,
surety bond).
(2) When P3 + P1 + Rcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, P3 + P1(1 − m) + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and Cs1(1 − p)
> ∆P4, (0, 1) is the ESS of the replicator dynamic system (IV) and the strategy is (default, surety bond).
(3) When P3 + P1 + Rcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, P3 + P1(1 − m) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and Cs1(1 − p)
< ∆P4, (0, 1) and (1, 1) are both the ESS of the replicator dynamic system (IV) and the strategies are (default,
surety bond) and (not default, surety bond).
(4) When P3 + P1 + Rcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, P3 + P1(1 − m) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and Cs1(1 − p)
> ∆P4, (0, 1) is the ESS of the replicator dynamic system (IV) and the strategy is (default, surety bond).
(5) When P3 + P1 + Rcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, P3 + P1(1 − m) + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and Cs1(1 − p)
< ∆P4, (x6, 1) is the ESS of the replicator dynamic system (IV) if x6 ∈ [0, 1].
(6) When P3 + P1 + Rcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, P3 + P1(1 − m) + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and Cs1(1 −
p) > ∆P4, (x6, 1) is the ESS of the replicator dynamic system (IV) if x6 ∈ [0, 1], y5 < [0, 1]. There is also an
asymptotic stable point (x5, y5) if x6 ∈ [0, 1], y5 ∈ [0, 1].
(7) When P3 + P1 + Rcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, P3 + P1(1 − m) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and Cs1(1 − p)
< ∆P4, (1, 1) is the ESS of the replicator dynamic system (IV) and the strategy is (not default, surety bond).
(8) When P3 + P1 + Rcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, P3 + P1(1 − m) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and Cs1(1 − p)
> ∆P4, there is no ESS of the replicator dynamic system (IV). However, there is an asymptotic stable point (x5,
y5) if Lcl − Rcl − P1m < 0.
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Proof 8. Based on the principles to judge the stability of the abovementioned equilibrium points, we
can obtain the result in Table 11. 
Table 11. Stability of the equilibrium points in dynamic model under high-penalty conditional bond.
Equilibrium Points
P3+ P1+ Rcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu
P3+ P1(1 − m) + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu
Cs1(1 − p) < ∆P4 Cs1(1 − p) > ∆P4
detJ4 trJ4 State detJ4 trJ4 State SpecialCondition
(0, 0) − ± Saddle point − ± Saddle point /
(0, 1) + − ESS + − ESS /
(1, 0) + + Instability point − ± Saddle point /
(1, 1) − ± Saddle point + + Instability point /
Equilibrium Points
P3+ P1+ Rcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu
P3+ P1(1 − m) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu
Cs1(1 − p) < ∆P4 Cs1(1 − p) > ∆P4
detJ4 trJ4 State detJ4 trJ4 State SpecialCondition
(0, 0) − ± Saddle point − ± Saddle point /
(0, 1) + − ESS + − ESS /
(1, 0) + + Instability point - ± Saddle point /
(1, 1) + − ESS − ± Saddle point /
(x5, y5) / / / + + Central point
x6 ∈ [0, 1]
y5 ∈ [0, 1]
(x6, 1) − ± Saddle point − ± Saddle point
x6 ∈ [0, 1]
y5 ∈ [0, 1]
(x6, 1) − ± Saddle point + + Instability point
x6 ∈ [0, 1]
y5 < [0, 1]
Equilibrium Points
P3+ P1+ Rcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu
P3+ P1(1 − m) + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu
Cs1(1 − p) < ∆P4 Cs1(1 − p) > ∆P4
detJ4 trJ4 State detJ4 trJ4 State SpecialCondition
(0, 0) − ± Saddle point − ± Saddle point /
(0, 1) − ± Saddle point − ± Saddle point /
(1, 0) + + Instability point − ± Saddle point /
(1, 1) − ± Saddle point + + Instability point /
(x5, y5) / / / + −
Asymptotic
stable point
x6 ∈ [0, 1]
y5 ∈ [0, 1]
(x6, 1) + − ESS − ± Saddle point
x6 ∈ [0, 1]
y5 ∈ [0, 1]
(x6, 1) + − ESS + − ESS
x6 ∈ [0, 1]
y5 < [0, 1]
Equilibrium Points
P3+ P1+ Rcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu
P3+ P1(1 − m) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu
Cs1(1 − p) < ∆P4 Cs1(1 − p) > ∆P4
detJ4 trJ4 State detJ4 trJ4 State SpecialCondition
(0, 0) − ± Saddle point − ± Saddle point /
(0, 1) − ± Saddle point − ± Saddle point /
(1, 0) + + Instability point − ± Saddle point /
(1, 1) + − ESS − ± Saddle point /
(x5, y5) / / / + −
Asymptotic
stable point Lcl − Rcl − P1m < 0
(x5, y5) / / / + + Central point Lcl − Rcl − P1m > 0
Sustainability 2020, 12, 9162 16 of 28
From the results in Table 11, if the values of Lcl, and Rcl are not large enough, (P3 + P1 + Rcl < Ccf +
Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, P3 + P1(1 − m) + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu), the strategy (default, surety bond) will be
reached as ESS is under a high-penalty conditional bond (no matter Cs1(1 − p) < ∆P4 or Cs1(1 − p) >
∆P4), which is not an ideal state. If the value of Lcl increases when the value of Rcl remains unchanged
(P3 + P1 + Rcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, P3 + P1(1 − m) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu), the ESS strategy is
still not ideal when the cost of the surety bond is not low enough (Cs1(1 − p) > ∆P4). However, we
can reduce the cost (Cs1(1 − p) < ∆P4) to obtain two stable strategies, (default, surety bond) and (not
default, surety bond). The latter strategy, (not default, surety bond) is the ideal ESS that we want to
reach. If the value of Rcl increases and the value of Lcl remains unchanged (P3 + P1 + Rcl > Ccf + Rcu −
Rcf − Ccu, P3 + P1(1 − m) + Lcl < Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu), there is a good ESS point (x6, 1) when x6 ∈ [0, 1],
y5 < [0, 1] and Cs1(1 − p) > ∆P4. We do not need to cut the cost of the surety bond (Cs1(1 − p) < ∆P4) to
reach a better state in this scenario, but we still need to do that when x6 ∈ [0, 1], y5 ∈ [0, 1] because we
only have an asymptotic stable point (x5, y5). Furthermore, if the values of Lcl and Rcl both increase (P3
+ P1 + Rcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, P3 + P1(1 − m) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu), the perfect ESS strategy
(not default, surety bond) will be reached when Cs1(1 − p) < ∆P4. However, once the cost of surety
bond is quite large (Cs1(1 − p) > ∆P4), there is no ESS point and we only have the asymptotic stable
point (x5, y5) when Lcl − Rcl − P1m > 0. In the following section, we will further analyze the numerical
simulation under a high-penalty conditional bond together with a low-penalty unconditional bond.
6. Numerical Simulation
6.1. Case Assumption
Based on the analysis in Section 5, this section will further verify the contents of the dynamic
evolutionary game analysis under a low-penalty unconditional bond and high-penalty conditional
bond, and study the influence of Lcl (the contractors’ long-term loss from the poor reputation in surety
bond institutions), Rcl (the contractors’ long-term revenue from the good reputation in surety bond
institutions) and Cs1 (or Cs2) (the owners’ cost of surety bond) on the behaviors between contractors
and owners through the numerical simulation on MATLAB software based on the function of ode45.
We discuss the evolution path of the game strategy between owners and contractors based on the
variables and parameters baseline assumptions shown in Table 12. The values of Lcl, Rcl and Cs1 (or
Cs2) will be set in the part of simulation, Section 6.2.
Table 12. Variables and parameters assumption for simulation.
Variables Values (Million Dollars) Variables Values (Million Dollars)
Rcf 1000 Ccf 900
Rcu 900 Ccu 600
Rof 1100 P3 150
Rou 300 Lou 200
∆P4 30 P1 30
P2 110 Cs2 50
Parameters Values Parameters Values
p 0.3 m 0.5
q 0.3 n 0.5
6.2. Simulation
We used MATLAB software to simulate the different cases of a low-penalty unconditional bond
and high-penalty conditional bond. In the simulation, we assumed that there are mainly two kinds of
enterprises in the construction markets—growing enterprises and mature enterprises. For the growing
enterprises, we set Rcl = 200 and Lcl = 400, while for the mature enterprises, we set Rcl = 400 and Lcl =
200. Cases 1 and 2 show the simulation under a low-penalty unconditional bond, and Cases 3 to 6
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describe the simulation under a high-penalty conditional bond. The value of Cs1 was set as 100 and 10,
which indicates the high cost and low cost of the surety bond, respectively.
Case 1. For the mature enterprises under a low-penalty unconditional bond, we set Rcl = 400 and
Lcl = 200, with other parameters remaining unchanged, which meets the conditions of P2 + Rcl > Ccf
+ Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and P2(1 − n) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu. We chose 100 random initial points to
simulate, and we set the starting time to 0 and terminal time to 10. The simulation result of the general
evolution tendency is shown as Figure 1a. The point (x3, y3) is the asymptotic stable point.
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From the simulation result, we can see that the results are in line with the dynamic analysis in 
Section 5.2. In the following part, the influence of Lcl, Rcl and Cs1 (or Cs2) on the behaviors between 
owners and contractors will be further analyzed. 
6.3. Influence Analysis of Parameters 
In this part, we will further analyze the influence of the parameters related to surety bonds on 
the behaviors between owners and contractors. Cases 1.1 to 1.4 describe the scenario under a low-
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.
Case 2. For the growing enterprises under a low-penalty unconditional bond, we set Rcl = 200
and Lcl = 400, with other parameters remaining unchanged, which meets the conditions of P2 + Rcl >
Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and P2(1 − n) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu. We chose 100 random initial points to
simulate, and we set the starting time to 0 and terminal time to 10. The simulation result of the general
evolution tendency is shown as Figure 1b. The point (x3, y3) is the central point.
Case 3. For the mature enterprises under a high-penalty conditional bond, we set Rcl = 400, Lcl =
200 and Cs1 = 10, with other parameters remaining unchanged, which meets the conditions of P3 +
P1 + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, P3 + P1(1 − m) + Rcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and Cs1(1 − p) < ∆P4. We
chose 100 random initial points to simulate, and we set the starting time to 0 and terminal time to 10.
The simulation result of the general evolution tendency is shown as Figure 1c. The point (1, 1) is the
ESS point, which means the “not default” strategy and “surety bond” strategy are the equilibrium
choices of contractors and owners.
Case 4. For the mature enterprises under a high-penalty conditional bond, we set Rcl = 400, Lcl =
200 and Cs1 = 100, with other parameters remaining unchanged, which meets the conditions of P3 +
P1 + Rcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, P3 + P1(1 − m) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and Cs1(1 − p) > ∆P4. We
chose 100 random initial points to simulate, and we set the starting time to 0 and terminal time to 10.
The simulation result of the general evolution tendency is shown as Figure 1d. The point (x5, y5) is the
asymptotic stable point.
Case 5. For the growing enterprises under a high-penalty conditional bond, we set Rcl = 200, Lcl =
400 and Cs1 = 10, with other parameters remaining unchanged, which meets the conditions of P3 +
P1 + Rcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, P3 + P1(1 − m) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and Cs1(1 − p) < ∆P4. We
chose 100 random initial points to simulate, and we set the starting time to 0 and terminal time to 10.
The simulation result of the general evolution tendency is shown as Figure 1e. The point (1, 1) is the
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ESS point, which means the “not default” strategy and “surety bond” strategy are the equilibrium
choices of contractors and owners.
Case 6. For the growing enterprises under a high-penalty conditional bond, we set Rcl = 200, Lcl =
400 and Cs1 = 100, with other parameters remaining unchanged, which meets the conditions of P3 +
P1 + Rcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu, P3 + P1(1 − m) + Lcl > Ccf + Rcu − Rcf − Ccu and Cs1(1 − p) > ∆P4. We
chose 100 random initial points to simulate, and we set the starting time to 0 and terminal time to 10.
The simulation result of the general evolution tendency is shown as Figure 1f. The point (x5, y5) is the
central point.
From the simulation result, we can see that the results are in line with the dynamic analysis in
Section 5.2. In the following part, the influence of Lcl, Rcl and Cs1 (or Cs2) on the behaviors between
owners and contractors will be further analyzed.
6.3. Influence Analysis of Parameters
In this part, we will further analyze the influence of the parameters related to surety bonds on the
behaviors between owners and contractors. Cases 1.1 to 1.4 describe the scenario under a low-penalty
unconditional bond, while the analysis under a high-penalty conditional bond is shown in Case 2.1 to
2.7. Here, the starting time is set to 0 and the terminal time to 1 in Cases 1.1 to 2.6. In Case 2.7, the
terminal time is set to 5 instead.
Case 1.1. By setting Lcl = 0, Cs2 = 50, and keeping the other parameters consistent with the
baseline, the initial point is (0.4, 0.4). Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 2 show the results of the sensitivity
analysis, in which Rcl increases from 0 to 320 with an addition of 80. From panel (a), we can see that
with an increasing Rcl, contractors are more likely to change its strategy from “default” to “not default”.
The more loss caused by the poor reputation in surety bond institutions will help restrict the default
behavior of contractors. For panel (b), if Rcl increases, the proportion of owners implementing the
“surety bond” strategy will decrease.
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Figure 2. Influence of Rcl in Case 1.1. (a) Influence on contractors. (b) Influence on owners.
Case 1.2. By setting Rcl = 0, Cs2 = 50, and keeping the other parameters consistent with the
baseline, the initial point is (0.4, 0.4). Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 3 show the results of the sensitivity
analysis, in which Lcl increases from 0 to 320 with an addition of 80. From the results, we can see that
the changes of Lcl have almost no influence on the behaviors between owners and contractors.
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Figure 3. Influence of Lcl in Case 1.2. (a) Influence on contractors. (b) Influence on owners.
Case 1.3. By setting Rcl = 0, Lcl = 0, and keeping the other parameters consistent with the baseline,
the initial point is (0.4, 0.4). Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 4 show the results of the sensitivity analysis,
in which Cs2 increases from 10 to 90 with an addition of 40. From panel (b), when Cs2 increases, the
strategies of owners and contractors do not change, but the owners reach the surety bond strategy
much more slowly.
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Figure 4. Influence of Cs2 in Case 1.3. (a) Influence on contractors. (b) Influence on owners.
Case 1.4. By setting Rcl = 400, Lcl = 200, and keeping the other parameters consistent with the
baseline, the initial point is (0.4, 0.4). Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 5 show the results of the sensitivity
analysis, in which Cs2 increases from 10 to 90 with an addition of 40. From panels (a) and (b), the
increasing Cs2 has a great influence on the strategies of owners and contractors. More contractors are
likely to change from the “not default” to “default” strategy, while the owners change from the surety
bond to the “not surety bond” strategy.
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Figure 5. Influence of Cs2 in Case 1.4. (a) Influence on contractors. (b) Influence on owners.
Case 2.1. By setting Lcl = 0, Cs1 = 70, and keeping the other parameters consistent with the baseline,
the initial point is (0.4, 0.4). Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 6 show the results of the sensitivity analysis, in
which Rcl increases from 0 to 400 with an addition of 100. In panel (a), it can be seen that with the
increasing Rcl, more contractors are likely to change their strategy from “default” to “not default”.
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the initial point is (0.4, 0.4). Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 8 show the results of the sensitivity analysis, 
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Figure 6. Influence of Rcl in Case 2.1. (a) Influence on contractors. (b) Influence on owners.
Case 2.2. By setting Lcl = 0, Cs1 = 10, and keeping the other parameters consistent with the baseline,
the initial point is (0.4, 0.4). Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 7 show the results of the sensitivity analysis, in
which Rcl increases from 0 to 400 with an addition of 100. From panel (a), we can see that with the
increasing Rcl, more contractors are likely to change their strategy from “default” to “not default”.
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Figure 7. Influence of Rcl in Case 2.2. (a) Influence on contractors. (b) Influence on owners.
Case 2.3. By setting Rcl = 0, Cs1 = 70, and keeping the other parameters consistent with the
baseline, the initial point is (0.4, 0.4). Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 8 show the results of the sensitivity
analysis, in which Lcl increases from 0 to 400 with an addition of 100. From panel (a), we can see that
when Lcl increases, more contractors are likely to change the “default” strategy to the “not default”
strategy. However, the rate of convergence decreases with an increasing Lcl.
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Figure 8. Influence of Lcl in Case 2.3. (a) Influence on contractors. (b) Influence on owners.
Case 2.4. By setting Rcl = 400, Cs1 = 70, and keeping the other parameters consistent with the
baseline, the initial point is (0.4, 0.4). Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 9 show the results of the sensitivity
analysis, in which Lcl increases from 0 to 400 with an addition of 100. In panel (a), it can be seen that if
Lcl increases, the proportion of contractors adopting the “not default” strategy will also increase. Note
that the rate of convergence decreases with the increasing Lcl.
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Figure 9. Influence of Lcl in Case 2.4. (a) Influence on contractors. (b) Influence on owners.
Case 2.5. By setting Rcl = 0, Cs1 = 10, and keeping the other parameters consistent with the
baseline, the initial point is (0.4, 0.4). Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 10 show the results of the sensitivity
analysis, in which Lcl increases from 0 to 400 with an addition of 100. In panel (a), more contractors are
likely to implement the “not default” strategy with the increasing Lcl.
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Figure 10. Influence of Lcl in Case 2.5. (a) Influence on contractors. (b) Influence on owners.
Case 2.6. By setting Rcl = 0, Lcl = 0, and keeping the other parameters consistent with the baseline,
the initial point is (0.4, 0.4). Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 11 show the results of the sensitivity analysis, in
which Cs1 increases from 10 to 70 with an addition of 30. From the results, we can see that the changes
of Cs1 have almost no influence on the behaviors between owners and contractors.
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Figure 11. Influence of Cs1 in Case 2.6. (a) Influence on contractors. (b) Influence on owners.
Case 2.7. By setting Rcl = 400, Lcl = 200, and keeping the other parameters consistent with the
baseline, the initial point is (0.4, 0.4). Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 12 show the results of the sensitivity
analysis, in which Cs1 increases from 10 to 70 with an addition of 30. We can see from both panels
that the increasing Cs1 will reduce the rate of convergence and change the strategies of owners and
contractors. The proportion of contractors implementing the “not default” strategy and the ratio of
owners implementing the “surety bond” strategy both decrease with an increasing Cs1.
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7. Discussions
This paper analyzes the behaviors between owners and contractors based on dynamic evolutionary
game analysis, to discover how to use surety bonds to restrict the default behavior of contractors. Two
circumstances are considered—the low-penalty unconditional bond and the high-penalty conditional
bond. Though the perfect ESS strategy (not default, not surety bond) cannot be reached in any
scenario, some cases still have the good ESS strategy (not default, surety bond). A numerical analysis
is also conducted to further explore some parameters’ influence on the behaviors between owners and
contractors. The results are discussed as following:
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1. Low-penalty unconditional bond
In the analysis in Section 6.3, Rcl plays a leading role in the influence of the contractors’ strategy
choice. More contractors are likely to adopt the “not default” strategy with an increasing Rcl. Cs2 is also
an important factor that influences the contractors’ behavior. When Rcl and Lcl are large enough, the
decreasing Cs2 will help change the contractors’ strategy from the “default” one to “not default” one.
However, if Rcl and Lcl are not large enough, Cs2 has almost no influence on the contractors’ behavior.
For the factor Lcl, it has no effect on the strategy choice of contractors, unless combined with Rcl and Lcl.
2. High-penalty conditional bond
In the analysis in Section 6.3, Rcl still plays a leading role in the influence of the contractors’ strategy
choice under a high-penalty conditional bond. With the value of Rcl increasing, more contractors tend
to implement the “not default” strategy. Similar to the situation under a low-penalty unconditional
bond, Cs1 is also important to influence the contractors’ behavior when Rcl and Lcl are large enough, as
the decreasing Cs1 will help the contractors to implement the “not default” strategy with a better rate
of convergence. However, different from the situation under a low-penalty unconditional bond, the
factor Lcl produces a positive effect on the contractors’ behavior. More contractors want to adopt the
“not default” strategy when Lcl increases. However, if the difference between Rcl and Lcl is reduced, the
rate of convergence will also decrease.
3. Comparison
In summary, the high-penalty conditional bond is a preferred method to restrict contractors’
default rather than the low-penalty unconditional bond. The factor Rcl has a more positive effect on
the contractors’ behavior under a high-penalty conditional bond. The effect of the cost of surety bonds
is almost the same under these two kinds of surety bond, but generally the lower cost of a high-penalty
conditional bond will produce more positive effects. The factor Lcl influences the contractors’ behavior
positively under a high-penalty conditional bond, while it has almost no influence under a low-penalty
unconditional bond.
Based on the discussion above, we hope to give some advice to the policymakers to keep the
sustainability of construction markets. The first advice is that the government should put forward
the high-penalty conditional bond much more than the low-penalty unconditional bond. It is also
necessary to establish the CMCS promoted by the surety bond system. The promotion of surety bonds
will be helpful in the establishment of CMCS, as the information exchanged in surety bond systems can
ensure that the non-default contractors will obtain more opportunities of construction projects while
the default contractors will lose more opportunities in the future. As a result, the values of Rcl and Lcl
are positively determined by the development of CMCS, and we should further develop the CMCS to
enlarge the values of Rcl and Lcl. Moreover, we need to keep the value of Rcl a little larger than Lcl to
reach a more efficient system according to the discussion above. That is to say, the long-term revenue
of the “not default” strategy should exceed the long-term loss of the “default” strategy. Furthermore,
a larger gap between Rcl and Lcl will help the market to reach the ideal state more quickly. Second,
reducing the cost of surety bonds is helpful to the contractors’ “not default” strategy choice only when
the CMCS has been established as driven by surety bonds. If the CMCS is not developed well, the cost
of surety bonds almost produces no effects on the contractors’ strategy. As a result, CMCS should first
be established, and then surety bond institutions need to be subsidized to reduce the cost at the early
stage. After the surety bond system has been well developed, some discounts can be provided for the
companies with a good reputation.
8. Conclusions
The issue of default in the construction markets is quite important, as it concerns the sustainability
of the construction industry. In this paper, we analyzed the mechanism and influential factors of
owners’ and contractors’ behaviors under surety bonds, from a new perspective of evolutionary game
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theory. Another contribution we have made is the dynamic evolutionary game model considering the
dynamic factors to solve the problem. The analysis results and the proposed policy suggestions might
be suitable for the countries where the CMCS has not been established, such as China. However, there
are still some limitations in this paper. First, we just finished the analysis of the behaviors between
the owners and the contractors. More parties need to be included through the complex networks
and agent models in future work. Second, the analysis in this paper was based on synthetic data, so
more real data can be gathered to further evaluate the analysis in the future. Finally, the functions of
dynamic factors in this paper are linear. Future studies can explore more types of functions.
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